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QUESTION PRESENTED
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that cov-
ered employees who work more than 40 hours in a
week must generally be paid overtime at a rate one
and one-half times their regular rate. To assure com-
pliance with that overtime rule, the Act and governing
regulations require employers to maintain records of
all hours worked by covered employees. If an employer
has failed to keep the legally required records, the bur-
den on the employee under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co. is simply to "produce[] sufficient evidence
to show the amount and extent of that work as a mat-
ter of just and reasonable inference."
The question presented is: Can an employee meet
that burden of production by testifying from personal
knowledge as to the number of overtime hours he or
she worked (the rule in seven circuits and under the
decision of one state court of last resort), or is the em-
ployee’s testimony insufficient unless "substantiate[d]"
by additional evidence (the rule in the Fifth Circuit)?
ii
PARTIES
The parties to this proceeding are set forth in the
caption.
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Petitioner Cheryl Kirk respectfully prays that this
Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the judgment
and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals en-
tered on July 6, 2017.
OPINIONS BELOW
The July 6, 2017, opinion of the court of appeals,
which is unofficially reported at 2017 WL 2889502, is
set out at pp. la-8a of the Appendix. The August 23,
2017 order of the court of appeals denying rehearing
and rehearing en banc, which is not reported, is set out
at pp. 45a-46a of the Appendix. The August 18, 2016,
district court Order Adopting Memorandum and Rec-
ommendation, which is unofficially reported at 2016
WL 4394336 (S.D.Tex. August 18, 2016), is set out at
pp. 9a-24a. The May 4, 2016, Memorandum and Rec-
ommendation of the magistrate judge, which is unoffi-
cially reported at 2016 WL 7734644 (S.D.Tex. May 4,
2016), is set out at pp. 25a-44a of the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered
on July 6, 2017. A timely petition for rehearing was de-
nied by the court of appeals on August 23, 2017. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, no employer shall employ any of his era-
ployees who in any workweek is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, for a workweek longer
than forty hours unless such employee re-
ceives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate
not less than one and one-half times the reg-
ular rate at which he is employed.
Section 11(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 211(c), provides in pertinent part:
(c) Records Every employer subject to
any provision of this chapter or of any order
issued under this chapter shall make, keep,
and preserve such records of the persons em-
ployed by him and of the wages, hours, and
other conditions and practices of employment
maintained by him, and shall preserve such
records for such periods of times, and shall
make such reports therefrom to the Adminis-
trator as he shall prescribe by regulation or
order as necessary or appropriate for the en-
forcement of this chapter or the regulations or
orders thereunder.
3INTRODUCTION
This case presents a circuit conflict that cuts to the
heart of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The
key and most frequently invoked provision of the FLSA
requires that covered employees who work more than
40 hours in a week ordinarily be paid overtime at an
hourly rate one and one-half times their regular rate.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). That mandatory overtime rate
recognizes the special burdens imposed on employees
who work more than 40 hours in a week, and encour-
ages employers to hire additional employees rather
than overwork their existing workforce. The federal
overtime requirement applies to more than 90 million
hourly and salaried workers in both private employ-
ment and the public sector.1
The overtime requirement would be essentially
unenforceable in the absence of a practicable way for
courts (and the Department of Labor) to determine how
many hours a covered employee has worked. For that
reason, § 11(c) of the FLSA requires employers to main-
tain records specified by regulation or order issued by
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. 29
U.S.C. § 211(c). Those regulations require employers to
maintain for covered workers records of the hours
worked each workday and the total hours worked each
workweek. 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(7). For a variety ofrea-
sons, however, employers frequently fail to keep those
legally required records. Their records may be inaccu-
rate, incomplete, or simply non-existent.
1 See 81 Fed.Reg. 32391, 32454, 32456 (May 23, 2016).
4This Court addressed that widespread problem in
Anderson v. Mr. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680
(1946). The employer in that case had kept no records
of the amount of time devoted to certain activity for
which the plaintiffs were entitled to overtime pay.
Each of the named plaintiff employees testified as to
the average time he or she devoted to the disputed ac-
tivity, but none of the estimates were "based upon ac-
tual clocking of the time." Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. v.
Anderson, 149 F.2d 461,463 (6th Cir. 1945). The special
master who heard the case declined to award any over-
time, reasoning that an award based on that employee
testimony would be "speculative, inasmuch as the wit-
nesses ... had kept no record of their time and admitted
that ... they could not tell on any particular day [how
much additional time they had worked]." Id. at 464.
The court of appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in
their entirety, without deciding whether the activity in
question was compensable, reasoning that "[lit does
not suffice for the employee to base his right to recov-
ery on a mere estimated average of overtime worked.
To uphold a judgment based on such uncertain and
conjectural evidence would be to rest it upon specula-
tion." Id. at 465.
This Court reversed, holding that "the Court of Ap-
peals, as well as the special master, imposed upon the
employees an improper standard of proof, a standard
that has the practical effect of impairing many of the
benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act." 328 U.S. at
686. When an employer has failed to maintain the le-
gally required records, the Court noted, it is unlikely
5that the employees would be able to "offer convincing
substitutes." Id. "Employees seldom keep such records
themselves; even if they do, the records may be and fre-
quently are untrustworthy." Id. at 687. "The remedial
nature of this statute and the great public policy which
it embodies ... militate against making [the em-
ployee’s] burden an impossible hurdle for the em-
ployee." Id. at 686.
This Court held that in evaluating overtime
claims where an employer has not maintained the le-
gally required records, "[d]ue regard must be given to
the fact that it is the employer who has the duty under
§ ll(c) of the Act to keep proper records of ... hours ...
of employment and who is in position to know and to
produce the most probative facts concerning the ...
amount of work performed." 328 U.S. at 687. Where the
employer has failed to keep the required records, "[t]he
solution ... is not to penalize the employee by denying
him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to
prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such
a result would place a premium on an employer’s fail-
ure to keep proper records in conformity with his stat-
utory duty." Id. "The employer cannot be heard to
complain that the damages lack the exactness and pre-
cision of measurement that would be possible had he
kept records in accordance with the requirements of
§11(c) of the Act." Id. at 688.
Mr. Clemens adopted the controlling standard re-
garding the quantum of evidence an employee must ad-
duce in the absence of accurate employer-maintained
records.
6[W]here the employer’s records are inaccurate
or inadequate[,] ... an employee has carried
his burden if he proves that he has in fact per-
formed work for which he was improperly
compensated and if he produces sufficient ev-
idence to show the amount and extent of that
work as a matter of just and reasonable infer-
ence. The burden then shifts to the employer
to come forward with evidence of the precise
amount of work performed or with evidence to
negative the reasonableness of the inference
to be drawn from the employee’s evidence. If
the employer fails to produce such evidence,
the court may then award damages to the em-
ployee, even though the result be only approx-
imate.
Id. at 687-88 (emphasis added). This Court reiterated
the Mr. Clemens standard in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Boua-
phakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016). "For nearly 70
years, the Mr. Clemens framework has been essential
to effective enforcement of the FLSA .... " Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, p. 7, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct.
1036 (2016), available at 2015 WL 5719741.
Faithfully applying Mt. Clemens, seven courts of
appeals, and one state court of last resort, hold that an
employee can meet that burden by testifying from per-
sonal knowledge as to the number of overtime hours
he or she worked. Those courts reason that to require
testifying workers to go further, and substantiate their
testimony with records or other additional evidence,
would impose on those workers an often impossible
7burden, and would create an incentive for employers to
violate the record-keeping provision of the FLSA in or-
der to escape liability for violations of the overtime pro-
vision of the Act. The Fifth Circuit, however, imposes
just such a substantiation requirement, holding in this
case, as it has in the past, that employee testimony
about how many hours he or she worked is legally in-
sufficient to support an FLSA overtime claim unless
that testimony is "substantiate[d]" by other evidence.
App. 7a.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Cheryl Kirk was employed by Invesco to
organize and teach computer classes for its employees.
Invesco is an asset management plan that sells invest-
ment products, and its employees use a variety of com-
puter programs in their activities. Kirk was paid a
fixed salary regardless of how many hours she actually
worked. Kirk commenced this action in federal court,
alleging that she was in fact working far more than 40
hours a week, and that Invesco knew that she was
working substantial amounts of overtime. Kirk as-
serted that because of the nature of her work, she was
covered by the overtime provision of the FLSA, a con-
tention that Invesco disputed. App. 5a, 28a. At the time
Kirk commenced this action, she was still employed by
Invesco; Kirk was fired seven months subsequent to
filing suit.
8Invesco moved for summary judgment on a num-
ber of grounds. Of relevance here, Invesco asserted
that it was entitled to summary judgment on the
ground that Kirk could not prove that she had ever
worked more than 40 hours in a week. Invesco did not
claim that it had conclusive evidence that Kirk had not
worked overtime, and did not offer evidence which it
contended proved that she had not done so. Instead,
Invesco argued that, under controlling Fifth Circuit
caselaw, Kirk’s own evidence of overtime work was le-
gally insufficient to support a finding that she had ever
worked more than 40 hours in a week. Invesco had rec-
ords for part of the period in question, which indicated
that Kirk had worked overtime, but the courts below
concluded that those records were too inaccurate to
rely on. App. 6a, 18a-19a, 35a-37a.2 The summary judg-
ment motion turned on, and this appeal concerns, the
sufficiency of Kirk’s other evidence that she had
worked more than 40 hours a week.
In her deposition, Kirk repeatedly and specifically
testified that she worked more than forty hours a
week. She stated that she worked "more than 60 hours
a week on average." Doc. 43-2, p. 71; App. 3a. She ex-
plained that she typically came to work between 6:30
and 7:00 a.m., and did not leave until between 4:30 and
8:00 p.m., depending in part on the tasks she had on a
2 The parties disagreed as to whether Kirk or Invesco was
responsible for those inaccuracies and for the lack of records for
certain periods. That dispute, however, was not relevant under the
standard applied by the courts below, and would not be relevant
under the standard applied in other circuits.
9particular day. Doc. 43-2, p. 66; App. 3a. Kirk summa-
rized the primary tasks she engaged in, and how long
each took. She testified that she spent seven to ten
hours a day enrolling people in classes, and that this
type of activity was between 70 and 80 percent of her
workload. Doc. 43-2, pp. 19-20; Doc. 48-4, p. 3. About 20
percent of her work was devoted to actually training
people, the amount of which varied between one and
three hours a day. Doc. 43-2, pp. 19-20. She described
the other activities on which she worked during the re-
maining time, including preparing training materials.
Doc. 43-2, p. 55. At the time that Kirk was deposed, she
was still employed at Invesco, so this summary of her
work hours was a contemporaneous account of her ac-
tivity, not a reconstruction of events in the distant
past.
Invesco argued, however, that under Fifth Circuit
precedents such testimony by a worker regarding
how many hours she worked is legally insufficient to
support a ~nding that she had worked overtime. Doc.
43, pp. 15-16; Doc. 55, p. 4. The magistrate judge to
whom the summary judgment motion had been re-
ferred agreed, holding that such employee testimony,
unless corroborated by other evidence, is legally insuf-
ficient. Citing several Fifth Circuit decisions, including
Ihegword v. Harris Cry. Hosp. Dist., 555 Fed.Appx. 372,
375 (5th Cir. 2014), the magistrate judge concluded that
"’unsubstantiated assertions speculated from memory’
were not enough to sustain an overtime claim." App.
34a (quoting Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,
815 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2016), quoting Ihegword,
10
555 Fed.Appx. at 375)); see App. 34a ("an unsubstanti-
ated and speculative estimate of uncompensated over-
time does not constitute evidence sufficient to show
the amount and extent of that work as a matter of
just and reasonable inference.") (quoting Ihegword,
555 Fed.Appx. at 375).
Applying Ihegword and Fairchild, the magistrate
judge put aside Kirk’s own testimony, and proceeded to
assess whether Kirk’s additional evidence - certain
records and testimony by her mother - was sufficient
to establish that Kirk had worked overtime. App. 39a.
That other evidence, the magistrate judge concluded,
"does not lead to a just and reasonable inference that
Plaintiff worked more than forty hours during any
week of her employment." App. 43a. Having concluded
that Kirk could not show that she ever worked any
overtime, the magistrate judge recommended that sum-
mary judgment should be granted, without addressing
the merits of Kirk’s contention that she was covered by
the overtime provision of the FLSA. App. 44a.
Kirk sought review of the magistrate judge’s rec-
ommendation by the District Court. In her objections
to the magistrate judge’s report, Kirk sought to distin-
guish the Fifth Circuit precedents at issue, and pointed
out that in other circuits plaintiffs in FLSA cases can
rely on their own testimony to establish that they
worked overtime, without the necessity of adducing ad-
ditional corroborating evidence. Doc. 64, pp. 5-9. In-
vesco, on the other hand, argued that "binding" Fifth
Circuit precedent precluded an FLSA plaintiff from re-
lying on her own "unsubstantiated" testimony. Doc. 67,
11
pp. 4-5, 6, 7, 9-10 n.3. The company pointed out that
precedents in other circuits were "not binding in the
Fifth Circuit." Id. at 8 n.3.
The district court concluded that Fifth Circuit
precedent precluded Kirk from relying on her "unsub-
stantiated" testimony.
Kirk argues that the Magistrate Judge incor-
rectly found that Kirk’s testimony was insuf-
ficient to establish that she worked overtime
hours .... Kirk contends that, in an FLSA mis-
classification case, an employee’s mere testi-
mony of overtime hours worked is sufficient
evidence to defeat an employer’s motion for
summary judgment .... [Although plaintiff ar-
gues] that an employee’s unsubstantiated tes-
timony is sufficient to survive summary
judgment, the court finds that the weight of
authority does not support this position ....
[T]he court finds that Kirk’s testimony that
she worked sixty hours per week, unless
properly substantiated by other evidence, is
insufficient to establish that she performed
overtime work for which she was not compen-
sated.
App. 20a-21a (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit au-
thority that precluded reliance on "mere testimony,"
the district court explained, was Ihegword.
In Ihegword the Fifth Circuit... agreed.., that
"an unsubstantiated and speculative estimate
of uncompensated overtime does not consti-
tute evidence sufficient to show the amount
and extent of that work as a matter of just and
12
reasonable inference." ... Other courts have
similarly held that a plaintiff’s unsubstanti-
ated assertion that she worked overtime
hours is insufficient to satisfy her evidentiary
burden at the summary judgment stage.
App. 20a-21a. The district court noted that several
lower court opinions in the Fifth Circuit had applied
this rule in Ihegword under similar circumstances.
App. 21a. The district court proceeded to examine
Kirk’s other evidence, and concluded that it was "insuf-
ficient to substantiate her testimony that she worked
overtime hours." App. 23a. Because it concluded that
Kirk could not prove that she had ever worked any
overtime, the district court declined to decide whether
the FLSA overtime provisions applied to her. Id.
On appeal, Kirk insisted that a worker’s testimony
can be sufficient, without independent corroboration,
to establish that she worked more than 40 hours in a
week. Brief of Appellant Cheryl Kirk, pp. 32-41, avail-
able at 2016 WL 6574231. Kirk pointed out that
"[c]ourts around the country regularly rely on plain-
tiffs’/employees’ testimony to create a fact question of
hours worked, especially ... where accurate time rec-
ords are not maintained" (id. at 34), citing decisions in
the Second, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. In-
vesco, on the other hand, repeatedly insisted that Fifth
Circuit precedent to the contrary was "binding," "con-
trolling," and "prevailing authority." Brief of Appellee
Invesco, Limited, pp. 13, 18, 24, 25, 27-28, 29, 30, 32,
available at 2016 WL 7157278. "[M]ere testimony
alone will not suffice to establish a ’just and reasonable
inference’ in the Fifth Circuit .... " Id. at 22-23; see id.
13
at 25 ("In light of the position taken by and within
the Fifth Circuit, ... Kirk’s mere testimony that she
worked sixty hours per week is insufficient to establish
that she performed overtime work for which she was
not compensated."). Invesco criticized as "anathema"
Kirk’s citation of decisions in other circuits (id. at 27
n.5), arguing that "Kirk’s reliance on non-binding deci-
sions outside the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit car-
ries no weight in this matter.... Not only are these cases
not controlling in this jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit
has already spoken on the issue Kirk challenges here."
Id. at 27.
The court of appeals reiterated and applied the
well-established Fifth Circuit rule that the unsubstan-
tiated testimony of an FLSA plaintiff is legally insuffi-
cient to show that she worked any overtime.
In order to raise a "just and reasonable infer-
ence" as to the amount and extent of her
work, an employee ... must provide more than
mere "unsubstantiated assertions." Harvill,
433 F.3d at 411; see Ihegword v. Harris Cty.
Hosp. Dist., 555 Fed.Appx. 372, 375 (5th Cir.
2014). Even though Kirk presented the dis-
trict court with more than just her own as-
sertions, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that this "additional evidence is in~
sufficient to substantiate her testimony that
she worked overtime."
App. 6a-7a. Kirk filed a timely petition for rehearing
en banc, pointing out that the Fifth Circuit rule
conflicted with the rule in several other circuits. Appel-
lant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, pp. 8-9. The
14
court of appeals denied the petition for rehearing. App.
45a-46a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Fifth Circuit decision in the instant case deep-
ens a straightforward conflict regarding the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Fifth Circuit in this case held, as
that circuit has in previous decisions, that an FLSA
plaintiff cannot establish that she worked more than
40 hours in a week merely by testifying from personal
knowledge that she did so. Rather, that circuit requires
the plaintiff to also produce additional evidence to
"substantiate" her testimony. Seven circuits, and one
state court of last resort, reject that requirement. As
was true of the similar rule rejected by this Court dec-
ades ago in Mt. Clemens, the Fifth Circuit rule sub-
stantially limits the enforceability of the substantive
rights created by the FLSA, and provides a powerful
incentive for employers to violate the record-keeping
requirements of the FLSA and its implementing regu-
lations.
15
I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIATION
REQUIREMENT CONFLICTS WITH THE
STANDARD IN SEVEN CIRCUITS AND
ONE STATE COURT OF LAST RESORT
A. The Fifth Circuit Requires That Em-
ployee Testimony Regarding Overtime
Hours Be Substantiated by Other Evi-
dence
The appellate decision in this case applies and re-
iterates a well-established Fifth Circuit rule that un-
substantiated employee testimony is insufficient as a
matter of law to establish that the employee worked
overtime. The rule in that circuit originated in the sem-
inal decision in Harvill v. Westward Communications,
LLC, 433 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2005), relied on in the in-
stant case by both the court of appeals and the magis-
trate judge. App. 7a, 32a. The plaintiff in Harvill stated
in support of her overtime claim that her supervisor
had "required her to turn in false time sheets." 433 F.3d
at 441; see Harvill v. Westward Communications, LLC,
311 F.Supp.2d 573, 584 (E.D.Tex. 2004) (describing
deposition). The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s
testimony was insufficient to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment, because it was an "unsubstantiated
assertion[]." 433 F.3d at 441. Since Harvill, decisions
in that circuit have repeatedly held that "unsubstanti-
ated" testimony is inadequate to support an overtime
claim under the FLSA.
The Fifth Circuit applied Harvill in the oft-cited
decision in Ihegword v. Harris County Hospital Dist.,
555 Fed.Appx. 372, 375 (5th Cir. 2014), relied on and
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quoted by the court of appeals and district court below.
App. 7a, 20a. The plaintiff in Ihegword testified that
she had "worked approximately twelve hours of over-
time each week." Ihegword v. Harris Cty. Hospital
Dist., 929 F.Supp.2d 635, 667 (S.D.Tex. 2013). Citing
Harvill, the district court in Ihegword held that the
plaintiff’s own testimony, because not corroborated,
was insufficient to prevent summary judgment.3 Also
citing Harvill, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that applica-
tion of its precedent.
[T]he district judge noted the complete lack of
evidence, other than Ihegword’s unsubstanti-
ated assertions speculated from memory, to
prove that she actually worked overtime for
which she was not compensated .... As noted by
the district judge, "an unsubstantiated and
speculative estimate of uncompensated over-
time does not constitute evidence sufficient to
show the amount and extent of that work as a
matter of just and reasonable inference."
55 Fed.Appx. at 375. Two years later, in the officially
reported decision in Fairchild v. All Am. Check Cash~
ing, Inc., 815 F.3d 959,964 (5th Cir. 2016), relied on by
the magistrate judge in the instant case (App. 33a), the
Fifth Circuit cited Ihegword for the proposition that an
FLSA overtime claim was properly rejected "where the
employee’s only evidence was her ’unsubstantiated
3 929 F.Supp.2d at 668 ("Because plaintiffhas not submitted
any evidence other than her own unsubstantiated assertions that
she worked an estimated twelve hours of unpaid overtime per
week, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
for trial.").
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assertions speculated from memory ... that she actu-
ally worked overtime for which she was not compen-
sated.’" 815 F.3d at 964 (quoting Ihegword).
Harvill,4 Ihegword, and Fairchild have in turn
spawned a series of district court decisions in the Fifth
Circuit rejecting FLSA overtime claims on the ground
that the key employee testimony regarding having
worked more than 40 hours a week was "unsubstanti-
ated." In Oti v. Green Oaks CSS, LLC, 2015 WL 329216
(N.D.Tex. Jan. 23, 2015), the plaintiff testified in her
deposition as to the number of overtime hours she had
worked during the period in question. 2015 WL 329216
at *2. The district court, citing Harvill, rejected that
evidence as insufficient, because the plaintiff had
failed to "substantiate" her testimony and could point
to no "records" that supported it. Id. at *2-*3. In Miller
v. Texoma Medical Center, Inc., 2015 WL 5604676
(E.D.Tex. Sept. 23, 2015), the plaintiff testified that he
worked five overtime hours a day for 90 percent of the
time over a 45-day period. 2015 WL 5604676 at *4. Cit-
ing Harvill and Ihegword, the district court rejected
that testimony because it was "unsubstantiated." Id. at
*6. In Dixon v. First Choice Messengers, Inc., 2016 WL
774680 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 29, 2016), the plaintiff submitted
4 Relying on Harvill, the district court in Ihegword held that
the plaintiffs testimony "that ’to the best of her memory’ she
worked an average of twelve hours per week of overtime" was in-
sufficient to prove she had worked any overtime at all, because
the plaintiff "ha[d] not submitted any evidence other than her
own unsubstantiated assertions that she worked an estimated
twelve hours of unpaid overtime per week." Ihegword v. Harris
Cty. Hosp. Dist., 929 F.Supp.2d 635,668 (S.D.Tex. 2013).
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a sworn declaration that she had worked approxi-
mately 55 hours per week. Citing and quoting Harvill
and Ihegword, the district court held that summary
judgment was warranted because "[s]imply put, the
plaintiff has not produced any evidence ... apart from
her own unsubstantiated guesswork." Id. at *3. (Em-
phasis in original). "Since the plaintiff has not submit-
ted any evidence other than her own unsubstantiated
assertions that she worked an estimated fifteen hours
of unpaid overtime per week, the plaintiff has failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Id. In
Pickney v. Express Automotive Group, Inc., 2014 WL
4794587 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 2014), the plaintiff as-
serted in both a deposition and a declaration that he
was required to work through his lunch hour, time for
which he thus should have been paid. 2014 WL
4794587 at *2. The district court rejected that testi-
mony because it was "unsupported." Id. at *4-*5.
In Powell v. KB Healthcare Inc., 2014 WL 12531187
(N.D.Tex. Oct. 14, 2014), the plaintiff submitted an af-
fidavit swearing that she had regularly been docked
for 30 minutes of break when she in fact continued
working. The district court granted summary judg-
ment, objecting that the plaintiff’s affidavit was the
"sole source of evidence" and that she had failed to
"substantiate her claim." 2014 WL 12531187 at *2. In
the proceedings below, the district court relied on Oti
and Dixon (App. 21a), and Invesco cited Dixon, Miller,
Oti, Pickney and Powell. Brief of Appellee Invesco, Lira-
ited, pp. 24-30.
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The Fifth Circuit decision in the instant case ap-
plies binding circuit precedent, and reflects estab-
lished practice in that Circuit. State courts within the
Fifth Circuit follow that circuit’s interpretation of the
FLSA. In Tooker v. Alief Ind. Sch. Dist., 522 S.W.3d 545
(Tex.Ct.App. 2017), the plaintiff asserting an overtime
claim under the FLSA filed an affidavit stating that
every day she had to remain on the job after her nom-
inal quitting time in order to take calls and then lock
up. 522 S.W.3d at 561. Citing Ihegword, the state court
rejected that claim, reasoning that an "unsubstanti-
ated and speculative estimate of uncompensated over-
time does not raise a genuine issue to prelude
summary judgment as to Tooker’s overtime-compensa-
tion claim .... "Id.
The Substantiation Requirement Is Re-
jected by Seven Circuits and One State
Court of Last Resort
The Fifth Circuit’s substantiation requirement
has been rejected by seven circuits and by one state
court of last resort. See Dominguez v. Quigley’s Irish
Pub, Inc., 790 F.Supp.2d 803, 815 (N.D.Ill. 2011) ("the
cases are uniform in holding that an employee may
satisfy his burden of proof under the Act by relying on
his recollection alone") (citing decisions in the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits); Tomei v. Corix Utilities (U.S.),
Inc., 2009 WL 2982775 at "15 (D.Mass. Sept. 14, 2009)
("federal courts interpreting.., the FLSA have consist-
ently held that an employee may recover unpaid over-
time wages even where the only evidence of the hours
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worked is the employee’s personal recollection.") (cit-
ing decisions in the Fourth Circuit and several district
courts).
In Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201 (6th Cir.
2015), the plaintiff offered testimony similar to that in
the instant case, stating that he worked an average of
65 to 68 hours a week, and spelling out when he at-
rived and left work. 788 F.3d at 203. The court of ap-
peals overturned a district court decision that had held
such evidence was legally insufficient.
This appeal raises one simple question: Where
Plaintiff has presented no other evidence, is
Plaintiff’s testimony sufficient to defeat De-
fendant’s motion for summary judgment. We
hold that it is. Plaintiff’s testimony coher-
ently describes his weekly work schedule, in-
cluding typical start and end times which he
used to estimate a standard work week of
sixty-five to sixty-eight hours .... [W]hile Plain-
tiff’s testimony may lack precision, we do not
require employees to recall their schedules
with perfect accuracy in order to survive a too-
tion for summary judgment.
788 F.3d at 205; see id. at 206 ("Despite the lack of
corroborating evidence, Plaintiff’s testimony is suffi-
cient to create a genuine dispute of material fact
that forecloses summary judgment."). The defendant
in Moran argued that other circuits reject such unsub-
stantiated employee testimony, citing specifically the
21
Fifth Circuit decision in Harvill.5 788 F.3d at 206. The
Sixth Circuit declined to adopt the approach in Harvill,
explaining that it was inconsistent with prior Sixth
Circuit precedent.
Defendants cite no Sixth Circuit precedent for
the opposite conclusion; rather, they rely on...
a handful of opinions from other circuits.
None of these cases counsel in favor of ignor-
ing clearly applicable Sixth Circuit caselaw ....
[T]he out-of-circuit cases cited by Defendants
[do not] belie the applicability of our own Cir-
cuit’s on-point precedent ....
788 F.3d at 206; see Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC,
781 F.3d 799, 816 (6th Cir. 2015) ("Keller has not intro-
duced records that definitively establish the hours he
worked, but he has testified that he worked more than
forty hours a week. In the absence of those employer
records, ... a plaintiff’s testimony is enough to create a
genuine issue of fact.").
In the Second Circuit it has long been settled law
that unsubstantiated employee testimony is sufficient
to meet a plaintiff’s burden.
Consistent with [Mt. Clemens], an employee’s
burden in this regard is not high .... It is
well settled among the district courts of
this Circuit, and we agree, that it is possible
for a plaintiff to meet this burden through
estimates based on his own recollection ....
Because Keubel could not prove his damages
5 Defendants-Appellees’ Brief on Appeal, p. 21, available at
2015 WL 502464.
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with precision, the district court concluded
that summary judgment was appropriate. We
disagree with this approach .... [O]nce an em-
ployer knows or has reason to know that an
employee is working overtime, it cannot deny
compensation simply because the employee
failed to properly record or claim his overtime
hours.
Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 362 (2d
Cir. 2011). In Aponte v. Modern Furniture Mfg. Com-
pany, LLC, 2016 WL 5372799 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2016),
the employer asked the district court to apply the Fifth
Circuit decisions in Harvill and Ihegword. The district
judge, citing Kuebel, refused to do so, explaining that
those "out-of-circuit o.. cases are not binding on this
Court." 2016 WL 5372799 at "13-’14. The rule in
Kuebel has been applied in dozens of district court de-
cisions in the Second Circuit.
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that
a finding that an employee worked overtime, and as to
the amount of that overtime, can be based simply on
the employee’s testimony about his or her recollection
of those hours. Melton v. Tippecanoe County, 838 F.3d
814, 819 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Relying on the employee’s
recollection is permissible given the unlikelihood that
an employee would keep his own records of his work
hours."); Espenscheid v. Directsat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d
770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The unreported time for each
employee could be reconstructed from memory .... ");
Mumbower v. H.R. Callicott, 526 F.3d 1183, 1186 (8th
Cir. 1975) ("The District Court relied primarily upon
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plaintiff’s own recollections to determine the number
of hours she worked .... To do so was proper, as defend-
ants maintained none of the employment records re-
quired by the FLSA, ... and will not be permitted to
benefit from their failure to do so."); Clark v. A & B Au-
tomotive & Towing Service, Inc., 1996 WL 311487 at *1
(9th Cir. June 7, 1996) ("A & B ... argues that the dis-
trict court erred by finding that plaintiffs ... were enti-
tled to compensation for sixteen-and-a-half hours per
week [of overtime]. [The plaintiffs’] testimony, how-
ever, would have allowed the district court to award
even more compensable ... time .... Since the district
court was entitled to credit [the plaintiffs’] testimony,
its finding was not clearly erroneous.").
When the Secretary of Labor sues to obtain over-
time pay on behalf of workers whose FLSA rights have
been violated, he or she often relies on the testimony
of the worker or workers involved to demonstrate that
they worked more than 40 hours a week, and to show
how many hours of work occurred. In the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits, the courts of appeals have applied the
majority rule at the behest of the Secretary. In Wirtz v.
Durham Sandwich Co., 367 F.2d 810, 812 (4th Cir.
1966),
[t]he District Court found that [the employee
worked] ... a work week of 59 1/2 hours ...
Durham ... maintains that [the employee]
worked only an average of 45 hours per week.
No documentary evidence was produced, and
the District Court’s finding was based upon
[the employee’s] credited testimony.... Durham
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failed to keep any records of the time Davis
worked .... The[] [Mt. Clemens] standard was
satisfied on trial.
367 F.3d at 812; see McFeeley v. Jackson Street Enter-
tainment, LLC, 825 F.3d 235,247 (4th Cir. 2016) (in the
absence of reliable records "the best evidence available
came from plaintiffs’ own recollection [about how long
each one worked,] which the jury duly considered
along with defendants’ objections to its accuracy."). In
Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1972),
the Tenth Circuit explained that
[t]he trial court’s judgment ... is based upon
the testimony of the affected employees who
testified concerning the approximate dates of
their employment [and] the number of hours
they generally worked .... The testimony of the
former employees, standing alone, made out
the Secretary’s prima facie case.
454 F.3d at 1283; see Doty v. Elias, 733 F.3d 720, 725
(10th Cir. 1984) ("[A]t the time of trial the [plaintiffs]
apparently recalled the number of weeks they worked
... and approximately how many hours per week they
worked .... Each plaintiff in the instant case testified
regarding the approximate number of hours he or she
worked ... [The employer] offered testimony that at
least some of plaintiffs’ figures were exaggerations. It
is the job of the trial court to ... resolve conflicting tes-
timony."); Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F.2d 759, 761 (10th
Cir. 1947) ("The evidence sustains the court’s findings
as to the number of hours worked. The employee testi-
fied that he worked from 7 o’clock in the evening until
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5 o’clock in the morning, with the exception of Satur-
days and Sundays when he left work at 6 o’clock, and
that he worked seven additional hours each week col-
lecting accounts. The employer’s objection to the suffi-
ciency of this evidence is fully answered in Anderson v.
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co ..... ").
The majority rule in the federal courts of appeals
is followed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Graham v. Babinski Properties, 562 N.W.2d 395, 398
(S.D. 1997) ("An employee’s recollection of hours
worked may establish a prima facie case.") (citing
Mumbower).
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIATION
REQUIREMENT SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES
THE FLSA OVERTIME AND RECORD-
KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
In Mt. Clemens, the government advised this
Court that the stringent proof standard at issue in that
case posed a grave threat to the viability of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. "IT]he standard of proof which
the master imposed on the employees, and which the
circuit court of appeals confirmed, may so substan-
tially impair the efficacy of the [statutory] remedy as
seriously to affect the administration and enforcement
of the Act generally." Brief for L. Metcalf Walling, Ad-
ministrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United
States Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae, No.
342, October Term 1945, p. 9. "[T]hat standard of proof
... was too strict and would only encourage employers
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to evade the Act and deny employees the protections
intended by Congress." Id. at 12. The standard of proof
imposed by the Fifth Circuit, which bears a decided re-
semblance to the standard rejected by this Court in Mr.
Clemens, presents the same obstacle to compliance
with the FLSA.
Both standards of proof create a powerful incen-
tive for employers to violate the record-keeping require-
ments of the Act and its implementing regulations.
This Court recognized in Mt. Clemens that a rule that
makes it difficult for an employee to prove an overtime
violation in the absence of the required employer-
maintained records places "a premium" on violating
the FLSA record-keeping requirements. 328 U.S. at
687. A violation of the record-keeping requirements
creates an affirmative defense to a violation of the
overtime requirement whenever an employee cannot
meet such a stringent standard. The Fifth Circuit sub-
stantiation requirement "undermine[s] the remedial
goals of the FLSA, as it would permit an employer to
... have its managers ... not ... record overtime, and
then, when an employee sues for unpaid overtime, as-
sert that his claim fails because his timesheets do not
show overtime." Kuebel, 643 F.3d at 364.
The Fifth Circuit’s rule also encourages employers
to disregard the overtime requirement itself. As this
Court noted in the context of Title VII,
[i]f employers faced only the prospect of an in-
junctive order, they would have little incen-
tive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is
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the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay
award that "provide(s) the spur or catalyst
which causes employers and unions to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employ-
ment practices and to endeavor to eliminate,
so far as possible, the last vestiges of an un-
fortunate and ignominious page in this coun-
try’s history."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18
(1975) (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc.,
479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). The Fifth Circuit
substantiation requirement eliminates in many situa-
tions any "reasonably certain prospect" that a merito-
rious FLSA overtime claim will succeed and result in
a back pay award. Most employees are unlikely to have
access to a convincing method of corroborating their
own testimony as to the hours they worked. The slight
possibility that an occasional employee may happen to
have such evidence will have little deterrent effect. The
incentive for unlawful employer practices is particu-
larly great with regard to FLSA overtime claims, be-
cause employers actually make money by violating the
FLSA, which is not usually true for Title VII violations.
Illegality aside, if an employer can increase its bottom
line by denying a worker $10,000 in required overtime,
and then avoid liability by violating the record-keeping
requirements, that double violation of federal law
makes economic sense. The remedial provision of the
FLSA, unlike Title VII, does not permit aggrieved em-
ployees to obtain injunctive relief.
28
The Fifth Circuit requirement that employees pro-
duce evidence substantiating their testimony "improp-
erly transfer[s] the burden of record-keeping from [the
employer] to the Plaintiffs, a result that is plainly con-
trary to the FLSA .... "Aponte v. Modern Furniture Mfg.
Company, LLC, 2016 WL 5372799 at "13 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2016). This Court noted in Mt. Clemens that
employees themselves rarely create their own records
of hours worked, and that informal records may well
be less accurate than, for example, a time clock. 328
U.S. at 687. It would often be impracticable for an em-
ployee to create convincing records, and at best consid-
erable ingenuity could be required. Ms. Kirk might
have tried to document her daily arrival and departure
time at work by taking a selfie, while holding a copy of
each day’s newspaper, as she entered and later left her
office, and then immediately emailing the photograph
to herself to establish the date and time it was taken.
An employee would not even consider such taking ex-
traordinary measures until and unless she had con-
cluded that her job was covered by the FLSA overtime
requirement. Even that might not have been sufficient
here, however, because Invesco argued, and the magis-
trate judge held, that Kirk also had to establish, and
subtract from each period she was at work, the amount
of time that was devoted to "breaks, lunch, doctor ap-
pointments, and any other period when she was not
working .... " App. 42a. With regard to work she did
from home, Kirk attempted to establish those hours
through testimony by her mother, but the courts below
objected that her mother, quite understandably, had no
specific memory of the hours Kirk worked at home on
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particular days over a period of several years. App. 7a-
8a, 22a-23a. Most spouses or roommates might be un-
able or unwilling to function as a human time clock. An
employer could structure its operations in a manner
that made it harder for employees to corroborate their
testimony. In the instant case, for example, the soft-
ware on Kirk’s office computer recorded only when she
logged on in the morning, but not when she logged off
at night, so the magistrate judge concluded that the
computer records that did exist could not substantiate
Kirk’s testimony. App. 13a.
The manifest consequences of the Fifth Circuit’s
substantiation requirement sharply restrict the ability
of the Secretary of Labor, as well as that of individual
workers, to enforce the FLSA overtime provisions. The
government must establish that any employee for
whom it seeks relief worked more than 40 hours a
week, and must demonstrate how many overtime
hours were worked. In Labor Department actions, the
testimony of the employee or employees concerned is
often the only evidence which the Secretary has; the
government has regularly relied on employee testi-
mony in its overtime cases.6
6 See, e.g., Solis v. Tally Young Cosmetics, LLC, 2011 WL
1240341 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2011); McLaughlin v. Tony and
Susan Alamo Foundation, 1989 WL 90560 at *3 (W.D.Ark. April
25, 1989); Brock v. Seto, 790 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986); Do-
novan v, Kentwood Development Co., Inc., 549 F.Supp. 480, 485
(D.Md. 1982); Marshall v. I.L. Van Matre, 634 F.2d 1115, 1118-19
(8th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Carl Roessler, Inc., 361 F.Supp. 229,
233-34 (D.Ct. 1973); Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1283
(10th Cir. 1972); Wirtz v. Durham Sandwich Co., 367 F.2d 810, 812
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The district court aptly depicted the substance of,
and attitude underlying, the Fifth Circuit substantia-
tion requirement when it dismissed Kirk’s sworn
statement, despite being based on personal knowledge
of her contemporaneous working hours, as "mere testi-
mony." App. 20a. Except for the two witness require-
ment of the Treason Clause of Article III, the testimony
of a witness based on personal knowledge is generally
sufficient to demonstrate a disputed fact.
In most contexts, testimony standing alone, if
believed, will be sufficient to carry the day. In-
deed, a defendant in a criminal case may, con-
sistent with proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
lose his liberty (or his life) on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an admitted perjurer, a
convicted felon, or an accomplice .... In any
kind of case, a party’s uncorroborated testi-
mony can suffice to create an issue of fact and
defeat summary judgment .... It would be odd,
to say the least, if an FLSA plaintiff could not,
as a matter of law, prevail unless there were
evidence corroborating his or her rendition of
events.
Dominguez v. Quigley’s Irish Pub, Inc., 790 F.Supp.2d
803,805 n.6 (N.D.Ill. 2011). In an FLSA overtime case,
the defendant could of course rely on unsubstantiated
exculpatory employee testimony. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016), the defendant it-
self repeatedly invoked unsubstantiated employee
(4th Cir. 1966); Goldberg v. Anderson-Brown Patrol, Inc., 199
F.Supp. 722, 724 (W.D.N.C. 1961).
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testimony which it contended supported its positionT;
at oral argument, counsel for the defendant described
that unsubstantiated employee testimony as "the best
evidence" of how long workers had spent on the activi-
ties at issue,s Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his dissent-
ing opinion, relied on employee testimony which was
favorable to the defendant.9
In Tyson Foods, this Court granted review to
determine whether an unduly lax Eighth Circuit
7 Brief of Petitioner, No. 14-1146, at "10 ("the few class mem-
bers who testified admitted that Tyson required employees to
wear different personal protective equipment .... In fact, each tes-
tifying class member indicated that he was personally required to
wear different equipment .... Additionally, these employees testi-
fied that they don and doffthese pieces of equipment in a different
order.... Mr. Lovan testified that it took him eight minutes to
don his protective equipment"), *34 ("One class member o.. tes-
tified that it took him just over two minutes to don his equip-
ment").
s Oral Argument, No. 14-1146, available at 2015 WL 8491824
at *25 ("[I]f you take the testimony of the four named plaintiffs,
they- they were significantly different than the - than the 18 and
21 minutes times [in the Mericle study]. And so the - the best
evidence was, is that Mericle[’s study contained] ... wildly extrav-
agant numbers....").
9 136 S.Ct. at 1057 ("Even testifying class members would
seem unable to use Mericle’s averages .... [E]mployee Donald
Brown testified that [donning equipment] took him around 2
minutes. Others also testified to donniag and doffing times that
diverged markedly from Mericle’s estimates"; "this disparity be-
tween average times and individual times"), 1060 ("Testifying
class members attested to spending less time on donning and doff-
ing than Mericle’s averages would suggest. Had Tyson been able
to cross-examine more than four of them, it may have incurred far
less liability.") (dissenting opinion).
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standard had imposed on an employer - whose viola-
tion of the FLSA was undisputed - liability to some
class members who had not been injured.1° In the in-
stant case, the indefensibly stringent Fifth Circuit
standard - like the harsh standard rejected by this
Court in Mt. Clemens - often immunizes employers
from liability for violations of the FLSA. Protecting
workers from violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act is no less important than protecting proven viola-
tors from unwarranted monetary awards.
lo Petition for Writ of Certiorari, No. 14-1146, p. i ("II.
Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule
23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of
members who were not injured and have no legal right to any
damages").
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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